Many important insights are embedded in the detailed observations of surface rupture of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, during which surface faulting interacted with pipelines, earth embankments, and buildings. Lessons gleaned from the 1906 rupture, combined with parallel and new insights from recent earthquakes, illustrate how various geologic conditions alter the surface expression of faulting and how surface fault rupture interacts with engineered systems. Geologic and engineering procedures can be employed to evaluate the hazards associated with surface faulting and to develop sound designs. Illustrative examples are used to demonstrate how the hazards associated with surface fault rupture can be addressed. Effective design measures include constructing earth fills to partially absorb underlying ground movements; isolating foundations from the underlying ground movements; and designing strong, ductile foundations that can accommodate some deformation without compromising the functionality of the structure.
INTRODUCTION
On 18 April 1906, the San Andreas Fault ruptured more than 370 km and generated a destructive M w = 7.9 earthquake. Surface fault rupture was an important hazard from this earthquake. Large earthquakes since 1906 have provided additional examples of its effects to learn from and to advance the practice of earthquake engineering. Recent earthquakes, such as the 1992 Landers ͑California͒, the 1999 Kocaeli ͑Turkey͒, and the 1999 Chi-Chi ͑Taiwan͒ earthquakes, illustrated the devastating effects of surface fault rupture. Much has been learned through careful documentation of the patterns of surface fault rupture and its effect on the built environment ͑e.g., Bray et al. 1994a , Bray 2001 . However, re-examination of the well-documented observations of surface faulting during the 1906 San Francisco earthquake provides important lessons that, when combined with those from recent events, improves our understanding of this hazard and provides a basis for better design. The effects of the 1906 earthquake on engineered facilities are documented in several contemporary reports, most notably Lawson ͑1908͒, but also Gilbert et al. ͑1907͒, Jordan ͑1907͒, and Schussler ͑1906͒. The present paper summarizes these contemporary accounts of the interactions of surface faulting in 1906 with engineered facilities, augmented by observations from recent ma-jor earthquakes. Emphasis is placed on examining surface fault rupture from an engineering perspective so that insights regarding engineering procedures to mitigate the hazard can be developed.
One of the primary recommendations of many of the engineers who documented the effects of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake was to avoid siting facilities on faults. Humphrey ͑Gilbert et al. 1907͒ states, "It is a generally accepted fact that no structure could have withstood the stresses produced by the movement of the earth at the 'fault trace,' along which the maximum intensity of disturbance was localized." Charles Derleth ͑Jordan 1907͒ initially agrees, "On a fault line no structure can fully withstand the shock, no matter how well built," but later recognizes that "If fortunately located, however, a structure on or near a fault line may not be seriously crippled¼Where structures must be built upon treacherous ground or near fault lines, no expense should be spared for good materials, high grade workmanship, and intelligent design."
Based on the observations in 1906, avoiding fault strands for engineered structures became the norm. However, sometimes it is impossible or not practical for pipelines or other structures to avoid active faults. In response to this challenge, the engineering community has been able to develop methods to adequately design for fault rupture across pipelines and other lifelines. Although avoidance is still the most straightforward method of surface fault rupture hazard mitigation, sometimes it is more difficult to avoid surface fault rupture zones than to implement effective engineering designs. In these cases, it is time to move beyond merely setting back from major faults an arbitrary distance and to recognize surface faulting as a hazard that can be characterized and accommodated through application of engineering principles. Re-examining the observations of surface rupture from the 1906 earthquake in this more optimistic perspective of current practice provides important insights for developing effective mitigation measures for surface fault rupture hazard.
SURFACE FAULT RUPTURE CHARACTERISTICS
Lawson ͑1908͒ provides a compendium of the characteristics and effects of the 1906 earthquake, including a series of small-scale maps showing the main trace along the entire surface rupture. It is typically drawn as a single line and labeled "line of fault." Only locally, however, are there detailed maps that show the pattern and distribution of rupture strands at the scale required for assessing the response of engineered facilities to the rupture. For example, a detailed map of the Fort Ross area shows the fault rupture locally as a single furrow as much as two meters wide, or as multiple parallel furrows that are separated by 15 m to 60 m with lengths from 50 m to 350 m. Although in general the documentation of the rupture pattern is less detailed than the surface mapping commonly performed during modern post-earthquake reconnaissance studies ͑e.g., Johnson et al. 1993 , Lazarte et al. 1994 , detailed sketches and descriptions of observations at key locations provide important insights regarding the general nature of surface faulting from this event.
In Lawson ͑1908͒, the width of the zone of surface rupturing is described as varying usually from a meter or so to 15 m or more. "Not uncommonly there were auxiliary cracks either branching from the main fault-trace obliquely for a few hundred feet or yards, or lying subparallel to it and not¼directly connected to it." At these locations, the "zone of surface disturbance¼frequently had a width of several hundred feet." Even at these locations, most of the offset within the wider zone was confined to the main-trace and expressed by "a narrow ridge of heaved and torn sod." Where a carefully planted row of eucalyptus trees allowed detailed measurements, Gilbert ͑Lawson 1908͒ noted that "three-fourths of the whole displacement occurred on the main plane of the fracture, and the remainder was diffused thru the ground adjoining on the southwest." After walking the northern part of the fault trace, Gilbert noted that the fault break was generally a single line of rupture that remained within one or two hundred meters of a straight line connecting its extreme points.
Along the main fault trace where the horizontal offset was more than 3 m, the width of the ruptured ground was commonly documented to be only 2 m ͑Lawson 1908͒. Although the amount of horizontal offset across the main fault trace was typically 2.5-4.5 m, most of this offset was contained within a narrow zone that was only a few meters wide ͑Figure 1a͒. Similar to observations following recent major strike-slip earthquakes, such as the 1999 Kocaeli, 1999 Düzce, and 2002 Denali earthquakes ͑Figure 1b͒, there are locations where the strike of the fault is fairly linear, soil is absent or shallow, and the fault is well defined where meters of offset occur largely within a zone only a few meters wide.
Gilbert categorized three primary styles of surface rupture: the ridge, trench, and echelon phases ͑Lawson 1908͒. The "ridge phase" commonly was associated with an uplift about 1-3 m wide and as much as 0.5 m high, traversed by an irregular pattern of cracks with a more northerly orientation than the ridge crest. This morphology is commonly noted along many recent surface ruptures ͑e.g., Hartleb et al. 2002͒ , and is often referred to as a "mole track." The "trench phase" morphology, in contrast, included a shallow depression 1-2 m wide, filled with fragments of surficial material. The "ech- elon phase" was observed in areas that experienced neither tectonic uplift nor subsidence, and is characterized by a series of cracks oriented about 45°from main fault strike that do not intersect. Lawson ͑1908͒ notes that this pattern "occurs chiefly in wet alluvium," citing examples from the sand spit at Bolinas Lagoon, the Papermill Creek delta near Pt. Reyes Station, and Portola Valley.
These styles are related, in part, to local variations in near-surface stresses during the rupture process, as well as to the types of near-surface materials. Local transpressional deformation, where the surface rupture involves lateral slip and a lesser component of contraction, commonly results in the development of a ridge or mole track. Local extension during strike-slip faulting ͑or "transtension"͒ results from a component of faultnormal tensional stress that allows development of a trench. Local closed depressions along or within the fault zone ͑commonly referred to as "sag ponds"͒ may be associated with either transtensional or transpressional deformation. Transtension may produce local depressions along a fault strand, and transpression may produce uplift of en echelon ridges and intervening closed depressions that become ponds.
Lawson ͑1908͒ often notes that the en echelon rupture morphology often was associated with saturated alluviated flats: "Where the surface consisted of grass sward, this was usually found to be traversed by a network of rupture lines diagonal in their orientation to the general trend of the fault." This may be related to the response of relatively low-strength near-surface materials to the propagating rupture dislocation, although many alluviated areas along the northern San Andreas Fault are filled with deep soils because they overlie sections of the fault dominated by long-term transtension. Areas occupying these "pull-apart basins" generally contain thick alluvium and are characterized by broad, transtensional deformation, and thus often experience distributed deformation during surface-rupturing earthquakes. Areas dominated by the en echelon style of rupture in 1906 typically have thick alluvial fill within long-lived tectonic pull-apart basins, and can be expected to experience a similar pattern of deformation during future surface ruptures. As observed in recent events, there is a strong correlation between a wider zone of surface faulting and thick, soft soil. Additionally, at locations where the soil covering the fault break is very compressible, such as the loose wind-blown sand deposit described above, the distinct bedrock offset can be "locally absorbed" through internal deformation of the soil.
In explaining the variations in horizontal displacements measured on fences, roads, and other objects that crossed the fault trace, Lawson ͑1908͒ claims, Several examples of wider zones of distributed shear are noted, including the fence offset at Fort Ross where 2 m of the total of 3.6 m of horizontal displacement from the San Andreas Fault was spread across a wide zone west of the primary trace; 6 m of right-lateral strike-slip offset measured along a road in a zone 18 m wide; 4 m of horizontal displacement across a zone 90 m wide; and three fences near San Andreas Lake, where one had 5.2 m distributed over a width of more than 340 m, another had 3.2 m distributed over more than 90 m, and another had 3.9 m distributed over a width of more than 670 m. Stephen Taber explains ͑Jordan 1907͒, "It seems probable that the total displacement is greater than the amount that may be directly measured at any place along the line of the fracture, for there is evidence of drag in the soil for considerable distance on both sides¼fences formerly straight have been bent into a slight curve for a distance of 200 or 300 yards from the fracture."
This pattern of deformation is called fault drag, and it indicates that the earth is warped in a zone of simple shear adjacent to the main fault trace. This has been carefully documented in small-scale model studies, such as those by Lazarte and Bray ͑1996͒. Lawson ͑1908͒ surmised that the displacement of linear features across the fault at the ground "surface must be a minimum expression for the true extent of the movement in the firm rocks below."
Thus the amount of displacement on the main fault strand at the surface is a fraction of that which occurs deep within the earth crust along the primary fault rupture. Relative displacement along the primary dislocation dissipates as the rupture rises to the ground surface. Wells and Coppersmith ͑1994͒ found that the measured average surface displacement is about three-quarters of that which occurs across the fault at depth. This concept is critical for understanding the characteristics of surface faulting. If a distinct offset between two rock blocks deep within the crust occurs, the upper kilometer or so of earth materials responds to this offset through internal deformation of the earth materials on each side of the primary fault through secondary faulting and warping as well as through relative displacement across the continuation of the fault as it rises to the surface. This process continues as the rupture extends to the surface and can be exaggerated by deep, soft soil deposits or ductile earth fills that have not been previously ruptured. What is observed and mapped at the ground surface is affected by the nature of the superficial earth materials as well as the dislocation deep within the earth's crust. Even the main trace of the ruptured fault is merely a "symptom" of the primary rupturing event.
EFFECTS ON LIFELINES
The 1906 earthquake provided numerous documented examples of the interaction between surface fault rupture and linear features crossing the fault zone ͑Lawson 1908, Schussler 1906 , Gilbert et al. 1907 . Relevant qualitative observations of the rupture primarily relate to the pattern and style of rupture across the ground surface, which can be used as a basis for estimating the likely pattern and style at present-day lifeline fault crossings. The primary qualitative observations that are relevant to lifeline engineering are, in essence, taken for granted in current practice: that lifelines are damaged by surface fault rupture, that multiple crossings result in multiple breaks, and that crossings with acute angles can result in substantial damage. Although seemingly simplistic, the 1906 rupture provided clear, hard evidence that pipelines can and usually will be destroyed by substantial fault rupture. In a few cases, quantitative measurements were made where the 1906 rupture displaced linear features, such as roadways, pipelines, or fences that crossed the zone of faulting. These observations and measurements help define the likely location, pattern, and relative amounts of lateral displacements that can be expected and are directly applicable to mitigating lifeline fault-rupture hazards.
Lawson ͑1908͒ noted that the width of the zone of deformation produced during the 1906 earthquake was highly variable, ranging from a few meters to several hundred meters, and that secondary cracks commonly branched from the main fault strand. This point is particularly relevant to geologic and engineering analyses of surface ruptures for two reasons. First, the measurements made by Lawson "¼ignore for the most part any displacement that may be distributed on either side of ͓the main fault strand͔ in the zone of movement. The figures thus obtained may, therefore, in general be considered as representing a minimum for the amount of differential movement." Second, the distribution of coseismic slip across the fault zone is critical for intelligent design of resistant lifeline fault crossings, because the pattern of ground deformation can strongly influence the ability of a lifeline to withstand surface offset. In general, lifelines can more easily accommodate distributed deformation across a broad fault zone than an abrupt offset within a narrow zone. Therefore, characterization of the likely pattern of deformation across a fault zone is important for effective mitigation.
Nearly all measurements of the 1906 surface offset presented by Lawson concerned roads, pipelines, or fences, and essentially every measurement demonstrates that the main fault strand accommodated a large part, but not all, of the surface offset. In particular, detailed surveys of three fences offset by the fault provide excellent information on the pattern of deformation across a single fault strand. First, southeast of San Andreas Lake in San Mateo County, Schussler ͑1906͒ surveyed a fence that exhibited a total lateral offset of 16.9 ft ͑5.2 m͒ over a zone about 1 , 200 ft ͑366 m͒ wide ͑Figure 2a; Lawson 1908; Fence "C"͒. Based on this detailed survey, the primary fault strand offset Fence "C" about 7.3 ft ͑2.2 m͒, or only about 43% of the total, within a zone less than 40 ft ͑12 m͒ wide. The remaining offset was accommodated as secondary faulting or warping over a distance of about 330 ft ͑100 m͒ on both sides of the primary fault zone.
Similarly, Schussler ͑1906͒ surveyed a second fence and series of stone monuments northwest of San Andreas Lake that had a total of 12.7 ft ͑3.9 m͒ of displacement ͑Law- Third, near Fort Ross State Historic Park in Sonoma County, E. S. Larsen surveyed a property-line fence that was offset 11.9 ft ͑3.6 m͒ in 1906 ͑Figure 2b; Lawson 1908͒. Based on this detailed survey, the primary fault strand produced 5.4 ft ͑1.6 m͒ of offset, or about 45% of the total. Secondary deformation of the fence occurred over a distance of about 265 ft ͑81 m͒ on the southwestern side of the fault, although little or no deformation occurred on the northeastern side of the fence.
Qualitative statements in Lawson ͑1908͒ provide additional evidence that secondary deformation away from the primary fault trace was often substantial. For example, Gilbert ͑1907͒ noted a fence near San Andreas Lake that was offset 2.3 m across the primary fault strand but had a total offset of more than 3.6 m, suggesting that about 40% of the total offset occurred as secondary deformation away from the main fault strand. Elsewhere along the 1906 fault rupture, Gilbert noted that several good measurements of fence displacements yielded offset amounts of 5 to 6 m, but there were other fences or 
ADVANCES IN ASSESSING SURFACE FAULT RUPTURE HAZARDS BASED ON THE 1906 EARTHQUAKE S75
trails that showed only offsets of 3 m or less. Presumably, the remainder of the offset at these latter sites was accommodated via distributed shearing in adjacent ground, suggesting that as much as 50% of the total displacement was accommodated by secondary deformation. The pattern of offset is also strongly influenced by the number of major fault strands and complexity in the fault zone. For example, where a fence crossed two major fault strands, each having substantial offset, Gilbert noted that there was "¼dif-fused shear in the intervening ground." Thus, where surface faulting includes multiple fault strands or is otherwise complex, secondary deformation may accommodate a substantial percentage of the total near-surface strain.
Schussler ͑1906͒ and Lawson ͑1908͒ document a few examples of pipeline fault crossings. About one mile northwest of San Andreas Lake, the 76-cm-diameter Pilarcitos water pipeline obliquely crossed the fault several times with low intersection angles ͑of-ten ϳ15°͒. The pipe failed in compression in three places, with a total measured contraction of 2.9 m. It is not clear whether the three breaks are associated with individual fault strands, localized contraction, or local weaknesses in the pipeline that would allow incipient buckling and subsequent pipe failure. In general, failure of buried pipelines may not occur at the exact point of fault rupture because axial forces may be propagated along the pipe to a location with lower yield strength where failure is more likely to occur. The Pilarcitos pipeline crossed the San Andreas Fault at several localities and with different orientations, exemplifying how the angle of intersection strongly influences the type and amount of deformation and showing that pipelines can be extended or compressed as a result of lateral slip ͑Figure 3͒. Lawson ͑1908͒ includes other examples of pipe failures that did not necessarily occur at fault ruptures, although details of these surveys are not sufficient to quantify the exact deformation pattern across the zones. Similarly, postulated offset of the Pajaro River bridge ͑Jordan 1907, Lawson 1908͒ qualitatively highlight the effects of large earthquakes on this type of lifeline, but quantitative details on the amount and locations of ruptures are inadequate for application to mitigation design.
Damage to the Pilarcitos pipeline was severe, in part because it crossed the fault many times and at particularly unfavorable angles. This led contemporary engineers to suggest that avoidance of pipeline fault crossings may be the most appropriate design. For example, Humphrey ͑Gilbert et al. 1907͒ states, "It is evident that it would be futile to attempt to build this conduit strong enough to withstand a slip on the fault line," and Derleth ͑Jordan 1907͒ concludes that "The Pilarcitos conduit must be abandoned." Because of an overwhelming need for pipelines to extend across active fault zones, other alternatives have been developed through engineering advancements in rupture mitigation design. For example, the survival of the trans-Alaska pipeline Alaskan Pipeline across the Denali fault surface rupture in 2002 ͑Honegger et al. 2004͒ exemplifies how sound engineering design can mitigate expected surface deformation. Oddly enough, advancements in designing pipeline fault crossings since 1906 have been greater than advancements in designing rupture-resistant or rupture-tolerant designs of other types of engineered structures ͑i.e., buildings͒ that more commonly use avoidance as a mitigation alternative.
Prentice and Ponti ͑1997͒ provide a comprehensive review and analysis of the contemporary accounts of deformation of Wright's tunnel in the Santa Cruz Mountains. These workers note that the pattern and amount of deformation of the tunnel, as mapped in detail by Matthews ͑Lawson 1908͒ has been called into question based on an uncertain measurement datum and post-earthquake construction. However, detailed analysis of the tunnel measurements by Prentice and Ponti ͑1997͒ indicated that the 60-85% of the total displacement on the San Andreas Fault during the 1906 earthquake occurred across a single fault plane, and that the remaining 15-40% occurred as distributed strain within a few hundred meters of the main fault strand. These results, which are similar to those from detailed measurements across later surface ruptures ͑as described below͒, show that tunnels and other lifelines usually cannot withstand surface rupture without specialized engineering design.
The pattern of primary and secondary deformation across the 1906 surface-fault rupture is echoed by recent studies that document lateral offsets produced by the 1999 Turkey and 2002 Denali earthquakes. Rockwell et al. ͑2001͒ surveyed long, linear alignments of trees, fence lines, walls, and canals displaced by the 1999 Kocaeli ͑M w = 7.4͒ and 1999 Düzce ͑M w = 7.1͒ earthquakes. These surveys show that an average of about 15% of the total surface fault slip occurred off the primary fault trace, with values ranging from 0 to 40% of the total slip. As with the 1906 rupture, warping or drag accommodated part of the lateral deformation within a zone as much as 30 m wide. These recent surveys support the original observations based on the 1906 surface rupture that substantial amounts of nonbrittle, off-fault deformation are associated with ruptures in areas of alluvial fill.
These documented rupture characteristics can be used in evaluating the expected pattern of deformation that a pipeline, rail line, or other lifelines may be subjected to during
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surface fault rupture. For most lifeline fault crossings, the expected pattern, width, and relative importance of individual fault strands must be estimated from regional and sitespecific geologic information, including regional fault maps, air-photo interpretation, detailed field mapping, surveying, drilling, or exploratory trenching. For example, the detailed fence surveys in Lawson ͑1908͒ provide a means to estimate the pattern of expected deformation that pipelines may undergo when placed across relatively simple, orthogonal faults. From the maps shown by Lawson ͑1908͒ for Fence "C" and the Fort Ross fence, plots of cumulative 1906 displacement are constructed that illustrate the pattern of deformation across the San Andreas Fault at these specific crossings ͑Figure 4͒. Accompanying histograms show the percentage of total offset that occurred within discrete intervals across the fault zone. The primary fault strand at each site accommodated a significant percentage of the total deformation, but significant deformation occurred on both sides of each primary zone. For Fence "C," the 30-m-wide primary fault zone accommodated approximately 55% of the total deformation, and the adjacent zones each accommodated roughly half the remainder ͑19% and 26%͒. The fence at Fort Ross shows an asymmetric pattern of deformation, with about half of the total slip occurring across the main strand, and the remaining amount occurring within a 90-m-wide zone southwest of the primary strand.
These historic data can be applied to other strike-slip fault crossings where assessing the location, amount, and pattern of expected coseismic deformation is needed for design. In the absence of site-specific data on coseismic rupture, the pattern of deformation from these and other surveys ͑e.g., Rockwell et al. 2002͒ in conjunction with sitespecific geologic characteristics provide a basis to estimate the expected pattern of coseismic displacements. For example, Kelson et al. ͑2004͒ used air-photo analysis, field mapping, and exploratory trenching to define the pattern of faulting along the Northern Calaveras Fault where it is crossed by high-pressure natural gas pipelines. In this study, site geologic and geomorphic characteristics allowed estimation of the relative percentages of displacement within discrete intervals across the fault zone ͑similar to the histograms shown on Figure 4͒ . Where specific fault crossings contain a single primary fault strand, we conservatively estimated that 85% of the total surface offset occurs on the main fault ͑zone "A" in Figure 5a͒ and the remainder occurs as secondary deformation within adjacent zones "B." Resultant cumulative displacement plots ͑Figure 5b͒ were used to calculate the amount of expected offset along the lifeline, which was then used in a finite-element pipeline model to develop appropriate hazard mitigation alternatives. Present-day mitigation alternatives include flexible pipelines that cross at high angles, stronger pipelines surrounded by low-strength backfill or open culverts, shut-off valves outside the zone of deformation, shear fuses along the pipeline within the fault zone, above-ground crossings, and many other designs. It is interesting to note that Humphrey ͑Gilbert et al. 1907͒ identifies the possibility of using shut-off valves: "It is evident that in earthquake countries water-supply pipes, at least, should be so laid as to avoid the action of slips, settling, and ground movements of all kinds. The pipe lines should also be arranged with gates and by-passes, making it possible to cut out any portion of the system which may become crippled."
At sites where a pipeline crosses multiple active fault strands in a broad zone, more complex rupture distributions should be considered. As noted along historic surface ruptures ͑e.g., Lawson 1908 , Johnson et al. 1993 , Sowers et al. 1994 , fault step-overs in strike-slip fault zones commonly produce distributed strain 
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within the step-over. For some lifelines, these geologic complexities may provide an avenue to decrease the likelihood of failure, if design or mitigation alternatives allow the pipeline or railroad track to be placed in an area of more distributed strain. In this way, the lifeline would experience a broader pattern of deformation, and thus a lower seismic demand across the fault zone.
In summary, the observations and measurements of surface fault rupture produced by the 1906 earthquake provide a foundation for understanding possible patterns and styles of deformation that lifelines may be exposed to during surface faulting. Whereas contemporary 1906 accounts conclude that fault avoidance is the best mitigation for lifeline fault crossings, post-1906 engineering advancements provide other alternatives given adequate fault crossing characterization. Quantitative measurements of fault and off-fault deformation generated by the 1906 rupture provide a basis for characterizing expected seismic demands on lifelines crossing active faults. The distribution of slip across the fault zone is estimated by defining a zone of rupturing across the main fault trace and adjacent zones of distributed deformation based on fault zone characteristics determined by fault trenching, field mapping, and comparison with historical surface ruptures. In this way, the mitigation and design of lifeline fault crossings, particularly in complex fault zones with multiple active strands, can be developed based on site-specific geologic information.
EFFECTS ON EARTH STRUCTURES
The main fault trace provided by the 1906 San Francisco earthquake cut across several earth embankments, including several earth dams. Fortunately, the main trace of the rupture passed through a rock outcrop separating the two earth dam sections of the San Andreas Dam. The rock between the dam sections was shattered from 2 to 3 m of rightlateral fault movement, but the earth dam sections were not significantly distorted, and were merely displaced relative to each other ͑Lawson 1908͒. However, the dam's outlet works, a 2.9-m-diameter, 4-course-thick, brick waste weir tunnel, was crushed where it crossed the main trace. Clearly, it is important not to site critical water control systems across active fault traces. The Upper Crystal Springs Dam served as a causeway, not as a dam, when the fault offset its eastern end 2.4 m over a width of about 15 m ͑Figure 6; Schussler 1906͒. At this location, the crest of the constructed earth embankment was only about 6 m above its rock foundation. No distinct offset was measured along the embankment crest, suggesting that the surface deformation occurred as distributed strain rather than distinct offset. Taber observes, "The fences on both sides of the road were broken in a number of places, and the unbroken boards were bent and arched so as to give a serpentine appearance to the fences." ͑Jordan 1907͒.
Three other earth dams also were documented to have been offset by the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Little is known of the construction of these earth structures, which limits what can be learned. A one-meter-high subsidiary dike of the Lake Ranch Dam was offset by the fault, which is where reservoir water was said to have run over the dike ͑Lawson 1908͒. The eastern end of the Upper Howell Dam was offset by the San Andreas Fault, and cracks that extend through the full height of the dam were found at the point where the fault trace intersected the dam axis. The dam did not fail. However, Lower Howell Dam failed from rupture of a 25-cm-diameter outlet pipe that was embedded in the earth dam at the rupture. Erosion at this location caused a 1-to 2-m-wide breach of the dam. Surprisingly, the fault produced "very little" apparent displacement at this point. This case history again illustrates that it is not prudent to locate outlet pipes across active fault traces, especially when the pipe is buried within the earth embankment itself. In a more recent example, fault rupture cut the water intake tunnel for the Shih-Kang Dam during the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake, and the supply of water for the city of Tai-Chung was lost ͑Kung et al. 2001͒.
An illustrative example of the importance of the thickness of an earth structure constructed atop an active fault is contained in the Lawson ͑1908͒ report. Southeast of Point Reyes Station two closely located road earth embankments that crossed swampy ground were directly offset by 1906 fault movement. As noted in the report: "It is noteworthy that the neighboring road crossing a marshy portion of the Papermill delta was much less cracked, and the difference is probably to be ascribed to the difference in height and strength of the two embankments. The thinner one suffered the more."
Clearly, a thicker embankment constructed of ductile earth fill will display less surface cracking due to an underlying bedrock fault rupture than a thinner embankment constructed of brittle earth fill. Finite element analyses performed by Bray et al. ͑1994b͒ and Lazarte ͑1996͒, as well as small-scale clay box model studies by Bray et al. ͑1993͒ and Lazarte and Bray ͑1996͒, indicate that for a specified amount of bedrock fault displacement, the height that the bedrock fault-induced shear rupture will rise up into the earth embankment is inversely proportional to the ductility of the earth material as de- 
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fined by its failure strain. If an earth fill constructed atop an active fault is sufficiently thick and ductile and the fault movement is sufficiently small, a distinct offset may not appear at the crest of the embankment.
EFFECTS ON BUILDINGS
With respect to the demands imposed on structures, the ground deformations associated with surface faulting are similar in many ways to ground movements resulting from mining subsidence, landsliding, and liquefaction. Although avoidance may be the most prudent mitigation measure for surface faulting in many cases, it cannot be universally applied and may severely limit redevelopment in areas where active faults have recently been identified. Additionally, in urban areas, it may not be possible to set back from every minor fault trace. For these cases, rational design and retrofit strategies can be employed to address the potential hazards associated with surface fault rupture. Observations from past surface fault ruptures provide numerous examples of the satisfactory performance of structures. Some facilities were sufficiently strong to withstand the underlying fault-induced ground movements without collapse. Other buildings were sufficiently ductile to deform in response to the tectonic ground displacements without failing. Still other buildings were somewhat isolated from the majority of differential ground displacement, such that the building underwent rigid body translation and rotation, without undergoing the internal deformation that is so damaging to a structure. These examples of satisfactory performance indicate that, similar to what is commonly done to address other forms of ground failure, effective design strategies can be developed to address surface fault rupture ͑e.g., Bray 2001͒.
Observations of surface fault rupture from past earthquake events indicate that flexible structures deform as the underlying ground deforms as a result of surface fault rupture. A barn that was torn apart by the differential ground movements resulting from the 1906 San Francisco earthquake surface fault rupture is another example. As noted by Lawson ͑1908͒, "The dairy barn on the Fitch Ranch stood astride the line of movement and was demolished by the torsion to which it was subjected" ͑Figure 7a͒. Five-meter offsets were measured at two fences at the Fitch Ranch in the vicinity of the barn. Similarly, one-story buildings on unreinforced concrete pads in Landers, California, broke as the stiff underlying ground deformed, indicating that they had very little influence on the patterns of surface fault rupture ͑Lazarte et al. 1994͒, and lightweight structures founded on isolated spread foundations, such as the warehouses in Figure 7b , deformed in a manner consistent with the underlying ground during the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake ͑Lettis et al. 2000͒ . This response is expected if the structural system offers very little resistance to the imposed ground movements. Conversely, the Skinner Ranch barn remained intact during the 1906 San Francisco earthquake although the main trace of the fault rupture cut across its southeast corner, because the structural frame was sufficient to carry the entire barn to the northwest as the structure's foundation detached from the ground below ͑Jordan 1907͒.
Very stiff, nearly "rigid" structures do not strictly follow the patterns of ground fracturing associated with fault rupture. Instead, the "rigid" structure being too strong to deform internally forces the ground fracturing and fault offset to occur around ͑not through͒ the embedded "rigid" structure. An illustrative example of this is the primary fault movement associated with the 1972 Managua, Nicaragua, earthquake, where the heavily reinforced 0.45-m-thick concrete walls of a bank vault of the Banco Central in downtown Managua pushed the distinct movement off of the primary fault strand to a zone around the embedded "rigid" bank vault ͑Niccum et al. 1976͒. Away from the Banco Central embedded vault, about 18 cm of fault displacement occurred across the existing primary fault strand. However, in the vicinity of the bank vault, the ground rupturing was pushed off the primary strand by this very stiff inclusion within the weaker ground, and new cracks formed to the west of the primary strand just outside the bank vault. The walls of the bank vault showed no significant distress. Only a few hairline cracks were observed in these heavily reinforced walls ͑Niccum et al. 1976͒.
The pushing of the ground fracturing around ͑and not through͒ the heavily reinforced bunkers at the Gölcük Naval Base from the 1999 Kocaeli surface rupture is another ex- 
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ample of how embedded "rigid" structures force surface fracturing to occur around them as opposed to through them ͑Figure 8; Lettis et al. 2000͒ . In this case, 4 m of rightlateral strike-slip fault displacement moved off its original fault trace and was deflected around these nearly "rigid" embedded bunkers. The bunkers rotated and displaced somewhat, but there was no evidence of distress to these structures. Several of the walls were inspected, but not even hairline cracks were observed ͑Lettis et al. 2000͒ . If the structure is designed sufficiently strong so that it can accommodate the significant passive earth pressures developed on opposing sides of its walls, it should rotate and displace somewhat as a "rigid" body with little internal deformation. Hence ground rupturing associated with the primary fault displacement will be accommodated within the weaker earth materials that surrounded the significantly stiffer inclusion.
Distributed ground shearing or tectonic warping outside the primary fault zone can also affect the performance of constructed facilities. In the absence of structures in these distributed ground deformation zones, differential ground movements are not localized across one particular shear plane, but instead occur across wider zones of general shearing. Although minor ground cracks may be expressed in brittle ground, ductile ground ͑i.e., soft, wet fine-grained sediments͒ may accommodate ground warping without cracking ͑e.g., 1906 San Francisco earthquake; Lawson 1908͒.
The different responses of two structures located just off the main fault trace of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake near the San Andreas Reservoir illustrate this point. As shown in Figure 9 , the brick gate-well was badly damaged by the distributed ground deformation between the main trace of the San Andreas Fault and an auxiliary fault to the west of it ͑Schussler 1906͒. The gate-well was constructed of an 8-m-diameter circular brick wall that was 0.3 m thick. The earthquake shattered the structure and deformed it into an oval shape with its east-west dimension lengthening to 9 m and its north-south dimension shortening to 6.5 m. This response can be contrasted to that exhibited by a newer concrete gate-well located 3 m to the north. The rectangular-shaped concrete gate-well was constructed of three compartments, each 0.76 m by 0.76 m in size. The relatively stiff and strong concrete gate-well was undamaged, even though it was located about the same distance off of the main-trace and was intersected by the auxiliary fault located to the west of the main trace. Significant ground movements occurred adjacent to the concrete gate-well, yet it was undamaged.
Relatively stiff structures will not strictly follow the pattern of distributed ground cracking. Instead, the minor ground shearing and cracking will not be sufficient to fracture the foundation elements of the stiff structure. Distributed ground movements underlying the structure will accumulate and be expressed as ground cracks along the edges of intact foundation elements. An example of this type of response was documented by Kelson et al. ͑2001͒ after the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake. Their mapping of the ground fractures observed at a site adjacent to the primary fault trace showed that tectonic warping of the upthrown block associated with displacement along the primary reverse fault led to stretching of the ground ͑i.e., extensional ground strains͒ that accumulated at the front and back of buildings, which were founded on relatively stiff foundations compared to the surrounding ground. Internal deformation of the building foundations was not observed. Instead, distributed ground deformations that were difficult to observe in the open fields were expressed where buildings were located as distinct cracks in front of or behind of the buildings. In general, historic ruptures show that stiffer inclusions within a weaker earth mass will merely rotate, tilt, warp, or displace a small amount when fault movement imposes distributed ground shear across the structure. The ground strain across the structure typically accumulates under the relatively "rigid" structure so that the integration of this strain produces minor fracturing at the edges of the structure. This is a localized phenomenon that does not produce significant ground fracturing away from the structure.
The type of building foundation has a large influence on its response to surface faulting. Structures that are tied to the ground ͑i.e., with pile foundations͒ will undergo the full relative displacement of the ground movements, whereas structures that are allowed to move relative to the ground ͑i.e., decouple͒, such as a structure founded on a shallow reinforced concrete mat, will undergo rigid body movement, but the structure will be isolated from much of the damaging effects of the differential ground movements. An illustrative analogy of this phenomenon is the response of a tree that is rooted in the ground compared to that of a concrete pole that is not. Lawson ͑1908͒ states, "Several large trees standing on the fault line were split or torn asunder," such as the one shown in Figure 10a . Humphrey explains ͑Gilbert et al. 1907͒, "This splitting action was due to the earth on the west side of the line of faulting moving the roots on that side, a motion which tended to pull the tree apart." Similarly, meters of surface offset during the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake also ruptured through a tree ͑Figure 10b͒, but did not damage a reinforced concrete telephone pole ͑Figure 10c͒ that was not rooted in the ground ͑Ulusay et al. 2001͒ . Severe damage to a pile-supported wharf and lack of damage of the nearby reinforced concrete bunkers that were both crossed by significant strike-slip fault movements at the Gülcük Naval Base ͑Lettis et al. 2000͒ also indicate that it is not prudent to tie structures into the ground on each side of an active fault.
CONCLUSIONS
Many important insights are embedded in the detailed observations of surface rupture from the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Re-examination of these observations, combined with parallel observations from recent earthquakes, provides salient lessons regarding the surface fault rupture hazard. Numerous cases illustrate how different ground conditions alter the surface expression of faulting and how surface fault rupture affects engineered systems, such as pipelines, earth dams, and buildings. Case histories from the 1906 earthquake and recent earthquakes have shown that the response of engineered systems can be devastating or acceptable, depending on geologic conditions and engineering design. Engineering geology in concert with sound engineering practice can be employed to evaluate the hazards associated with surface faulting and to develop sound mitigation measures.
In addressing surface fault rupture hazard at a site requiring rupture mitigation, the expected pattern of ground deformation should be developed through the use of detailed mapping and trenching. The patterns of surface fault-induced ground deformation from similar types of faulting during past events offer useful qualitative insights and quantitative analogies for developing reasonable mitigation designs. Geologic characterization of the likely patterns of expected ground deformation provides data for designing lifelines and other structures that can accommodate fault-induced ground movements. These designs may include placing pipelines or other lifelines across the fault in an optimal manner, using strong materials with high seismic capacities, or developing appropriate flexible systems that can accommodate permanent ground deformation. Critical outlet works for dams should not traverse active faults, and those sections of earth dams situated atop faults should be designed with ductility and redundancy. Building strong, ductile structural foundation elements that can accommodate some ground deformation and isolating the superstructure from much of the underlying ground movement are prudent design measures. It is not prudent to tie structures into the ground with foundation elements such as piers and piles.
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